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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MICHAEL W. HOM,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 970592-CA
v.
Priority 15
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY, a governmental
agency; CHERIE ERTEL; DOUGLAS
BODRERO; A ROLAND SQUIRE;
ARTHUR HUDACHKO; BART
BLACKSTOCK; and JOHN DOES,
Defendants and Appellees,

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
The Defendants-Appellees Utah Department of Public Safety
(the "Department"), Cherie Ertel, Douglas Bodrero, A. Roland
Squire, Arthur Hudachko, and Bart Blackstock (the "Defendants")
submit this brief in response to the opening brief of PlaintiffAppellant Michael W. Horn ("Horn").
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this case, which was
transferred to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court on October
15, 1997. £££ Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly hold that Horn failed to

state a claim against the Department for breach of an alleged
written employment contract because Horn's former employment
relationship with the state was governed solely by statute?
2.

Did the trial court correctly grant summary judgment,

dismissing Horn's federal disability discrimination claim against
the Defendants because it was barred by the four-year residual
statute of limitations and because the discovery rule did not
toll the limitations period?
Standard of Review:

All of the above issues are questions

of law, reviewable de novo.

See Berenda v. Lanqford, 914 P.2d

45, 47 (Utah 1996) (reviewing summary judgment dismissing claims
based on statute of limitations)•
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The following provisions set forth in Addendum A to this
brief are determinative of, or of central importance to, this
appeal.
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code
Code
Code
Code
Code

Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.

§
§
§
§
§

67-19-2 (1986)
67-19-15 (1986)
67-19-18 (1986)
78-12-25(3) (1996)
78-12-26(4) (1996)

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case arose over seven years ago when Horn was fired from
his career service position as a computer programmer with the
Department.

Horn brought suit for breach of an alleged written

employment contract and for disability discrimination under the
federal Rehabilitation Act.

The trial court granted summary

judgment dismissing Horn's claims because the applicable
limitations periods had expired.
held that:

More specifically, the court

(1) Horn's employment relationship with the state was

governed by statute, rather than by a written contract, and the
three-year limitations period for claims of statutory entitlement
had expired; and (2) Horn's federal disability discrimination
claim was barred by the four-year residual limitations period,
and the discovery rule was inapplicable.
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
On March 21, 1994, Horn commenced this action by filing a
complaint in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County.
Horn's original state court complaint was brought only against the
State of Utah, and purported to assert two claims:
employment contract and blacklisting.

breach of

Approximately one year

later, on March 6, 1995, Horn amended his complaint to add the
individual defendants, and three new claims:
3

disability

discrimination under § 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act
against all of the Defendants, breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing against the Department only, and tortious
interference with a contractual relationship against the
individual defendants.

Horn continued to assert his breach of

employment contract claim against the Department only, but
amended his blacklisting claim to include the individual
defendants Bodrero and Squire.

In March 1995, Defendants

answered the amended complaint, denying all allegations material
to this appeal.
In December 1996, the Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment seeking dismissal of all of Horn's claims.

In opposing

the motion for summary judgment, Horn filed a motion to use the
discovery materials from the federal case, which the court
granted.

On March 5, 1997, after full briefing and oral

argument, the court granted the motion for summary judgment and
issued a statement of grounds for its decision.

The court

dismissed Horn's breach of employment contract claims, including
the claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, because the four-year limitations period for actions
upon oral contracts had expired and the employment relationship
between Horn and the state was governed exclusively by statute,
rather than written contract.

The court dismissed Horn's federal

disability discrimination claim because the applicable four-year

4

limitations period had expired.

Finally, the court dismissed

Horn's tortious interference and blacklisting claims because Hom
had failed to provide notice of those claims in accordance with
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, because the Act retained
immunity for those claims, and because the applicable limitations
periods had expired.
1997.

Hom filed his notice of appeal on April 3,

In his opening brief, Hom challenges only the rulings

dismissing his claims for breach of an alleged written employment
contract and disability discrimination.
Statement of Facts
Administrative Proceeding
Hom was involuntarily terminated from employment with the
Department effective March 2, 1990.

In about March 1990, Hom

appealed the Department's decision to terminate his employment to
the Career Service Review Board ("CSRB").

R. 350-51 (excerpt

from Hom v. Sauire, Civil No. 91-C-1016W, Memorandum Decision and
Order at 13-14 (D. Utah December 1, 1994).a

An evidentiary

hearing was scheduled for April 1990, but upon Horn's motion was
continued without date. Xd.

In about October 1990, Hom

requested a stay of the CSRB proceedings pending the outcome of
his prospective federal suit. id.

In December 1992, the CSRB

issued an Order to Show Cause Why Appeal Should not be Dismissed.

l

A complete copy of the Memorandum Decision and Order is
attached as Addendum B.
5

Id.

In January 1993, the CSRB issued an Order and Notice Setting

Forth Deadline for Dismissal if Case not Timely Prosecuted,
directing Horn to schedule an evidentiary hearing on or before
March 31, 1993, or Horn's appeal would be dismissed.

Id. Horn

apparently failed to do so, and his appeal was dismissed for
failure to prosecute in April 1993. Id.
dismissal.

This Court affirmed the

Id.
Federal action

Horn also brought suit against the Defendants by filing a
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district court in
September 1991. R. 413.

In July and August 1994, Horn took the

depositions of several Department employees, who testified that
before his termination Horn had been "acting nutty," R. 975,
doing "bizarre things," id., and that his behavior had become
threatening, abusive and intimidating.

R. 1038-39.

In October 1994, nearly two years after the deadline for
amending pleadings, when the lawsuit was over four years old, and
on its fourth trial setting, which was only two months away, Horn
moved for leave to file an amended complaint to add a disability
discrimination claim under § 504 of the federal Rehabilitation
Act.

R. 414. Horn claimed that before taking the employees'

depositions, he had been unaware of any factual basis for the
claim.

Id-

The district court denied the motion on the ground

that it was untimely and would unduly prejudice the Defendants.

6
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State court action
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express contract - - employment fbetween Mr. Hem and the

He further alleged that the Defendants had discriminated

of the federal Rehabilitation Act.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Horn failed to bring suit against the Defendants within the
limitation periods applicable to his claims.

Homfs wrongful

termination claim against the Department is properly
characterized as statutory, rather than contractual, and the
three-year limitations period for an action for a liability
created by statute had expired when Horn brought suit.

In

addition, Horn allowed the four-year limitations period applicable
to his federal disability discrimination claim to expire before
bringing suit.

The discovery rule does not toll the time for

filing Horn's discrimination claim because at the time of his
termination, Horn had good reason to suspect that Department
employees perceived his behavior to be abnormal and possibly
mentally disturbed.

Accordingly, the trial court properly

granted summary judgment dismissing Hom's claims, and this Court
should affirm the judgment of dismissal in its entirety.

8

ARgWENT
Point I
THE TRIAL COURT! CORRECTL * DISMISSED HOM'S
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM BECAUSE HOM'S
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DEPARTMENT WAS
STATUTORY RATHER THAN CONTRACTUAL
A.

Horn's Wrongful Termination Claim is Statutory, Not
Contractual

This Court should affirm the dismissal of Horn's breach of
c o n L. i «i i L i h i iin d'ljri ! 11 I

1I

IH'fVM ti

can i s e .

career

service employee, Horn's relationship with the Depar tment was
c "-- -e

*••

between Horn and the Department.
K-"-"^'

'

terminated from

•

IUUI

Ai±&

-r'Dyment contract existed

Horn's claim-was commenced on

years after he was involuntarily

employment with the Department on Marc-

199C, and is therefore barred by the three-year limitation period
for "an action tcr a *iai;--ity wieaie:
state "

S e e l V^

rnde Ann. i 78-12-26(4) (1996) (1996 amendment

made stylistic
The Utah State Personne" Management Ac'., Utah Code Ann. §§
"r'

<

(

*

*

, gc verns the

employment of most state cait-c: be: vice employees, including Horn.

2

This brief cites to the version of the Personnel Act in
effect at the time Horn's employment was terminated in March 1990,
unless otherwise stated. The Personnel Act has been amended
since then and now extends to section 67- 3 9 40
I his brief will
note amendments tc *~u? relevant provisions when the provisions
are first cited.

9

In asserting a breach of contract claim against the Department,
Horn relies exclusively on the Personnel Act and the
administrative rules promulgated under the Personnel Act.
Specifically, Horn relies on section 67-19-18 of the Personnel
Act, which states:
Dismissals or demotions of career service employees
shall only be to advance the good of the public
interest, or for such just causes as inefficiency,
incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate
performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the
orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, or
nonfeasance in office. There shall be no dismissals
for reasons of race, sex, age, physical handicap,
national origin, religion, political affiliation, or
other non-merit factor including the exercise of rights
under this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(1) (1986) (1991 & 1995 amendments made
stylistic changes and substituted "service" for "interest").
Horn's reliance on the Personnel Act, and the corresponding
administrative rules, to define his rights as a state employee
establishes the fundamentally statutory nature of his claim
against the Department.

Indeed, Horn's contractual theory is

inconsistent with the well-established principle that "the
performance of a duty imposed by law is insufficient
consideration to support a contract,"

Prows v. State, 822 P.2d

764, 768 (Utah 1991) (holding buyers of savings and loan
corporation failed to state a claim for breach of contract as a
matter of law in alleging that state breached its promise to
guarantee deposits in accordance with existing statutory
10

obligati : i i)
In a case similar to this one, the Kansas Supreme Court
rec,

"•

- - •" *

"'

*.-^.:^«^., nature of a civil servant's
±n Wright v. Kansas Water

claim for wrongful : ..iiinatiOii.

Office, 881 P.2d 567 (Kan. 1994/, a former «tate hydrologist
alleged that the state water ^iep^r^m^^^ .4u~ .reacnej .
employren+" ^on^r2^*" - ^ terminating his employment
acknowledgment. :;.a: t:*c :::. ai^-j-,--

. . _:.

Despite its
/

terminated, the Wright court reversed the trial court's decision
grar.L-:.g ^ ^ _ ^ i--j,

- * -^ -cl - —-^

'• *

t

determined that the hydrologist!s claim was oarred because the

statutory claims, ratner than tne rive-yea: period .c: claims for
b r e a c1i :• f e

; :i : i t !::

J

at573.

Thecourtheld:

We hold that the employment relationship between the
State and Wright did not arise out of a written
contract. Rather, the relationship is fixed by
statute. The [Kansas Civil Service Act] controls a
classified civil service employee's employment status.
3

Hom correctly notes that this is a case of first :l r ipression
in Utah. Indeed, few cases directly on point exist in a.\y
jurisdiction. One reason for this dearth is the exhaust:
remedies requirement applicable to most wrongful terminate
cases by civil servants. Indeed, He m f s failure to pursue his
administrative remedies in this cas' = ::i s an alternative ground for
affirmance of the trial court's order dismissing Hom's state law
claims. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19a-101 to -408 (19
enacted
by
1, §§ 6-21 and establishing Career
Rev
raj, and Dep't of Social Servs. v. Hiaas, 656 r.
H,,
100^ x„,
1982) (upholding dismissal of state's appeal fr. ..
administrative order sustaining employee grievances because state
had failed to exhaus4" administrative procedures) .
11

The KCSA affords the right of continued employment in
the absence of a legitimate cause for termination. The
employment relationship of a classified employee to the
State is one of statutory status.
Id. at 571.
In analyzing whether the hydrologistfs claim was contractual
or statutory, the Wright court reviewed the state civil service
act, which created a department of personnel management and
authorized the director to make rules and regulations governing
all aspects of state employment.

Id. at 572.

The court noted

that although the hydrologist had identified a few personnel
records as the alleged contract, "the focus of his claim is that
as a classified civil service employee, he held a right not to be
terminated without a hearing and without good cause."
573.

id. at

Because the hydrologist "would not have had these rights

but for the [civil service act]," the court held that his claim
was statutory, rather than contractual.
Like the civil service statute in Wright, the Personnel Act
establishes a department of personnel management (the Utah State
Division of Personnel Management, now the Department of Human
Resource Management), and creates a comprehensive personnel
management system that governs virtually every aspect of
employment for most state employees.

Like the hydrologist in

Wright, Horn posits only the existence of a written, rather than
an oral contract, and the focus of his wrongful termination claim
is the just cause provision of the civil service statute.
12

Indeed, Horn is u n a b l e to identify any w r i t i n g other than the

support his contract theory. 4 A c c o r d i n g l y , ..ke rne
h y di o 1 o g i s I:' ' s :::: ] a :i rin :i i : Wi ial i I: ,. 1 1 • :: m' s 11: ::: i I g f i :i 1 I: = :i : n i :i i : e I: i • : i I
is statutory, rather than c o n t r a c t u a l .
F

v

~

under the Personnel

Act involve issues c: fundamental legislative concern,
othei

"

"

"

Like

-"stems, the Personnel Act advances the

important public policy that "comparative merit or achievement
govern the selection

"^

advancement of employees i n Utah state

government and that employees be rewarded for per fc rinai ice i i : E
manner that will encourage excellence and strengthen the system"
and of providing
for equal employment opportunity by ensuring that all
personnel actions including hire, tenure or term,
condition or privilege of employment be based on t:._
ability to perform the duties and responsibilities
assigned to a particular position without regard to
age, race, creed or religion, color, handicap, sex,
nationa 1 ori gi n a ncestry or political affiliation.
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-2 (3) & ( I
:

I "86) (repealed effective May

.ee also ISA Am. Jur. 2d Civil Service § 1 (1976)
4

Althoug:
L ai^uv. ^ a i uu* ttyd**wj employ ing a career
service emplo^
nter into a contract with the employee that
imposes obligations in addition to those imposed by Personnel Act
and corresponding administrative rules (so long as the
contractual obligations are consistent with the statutory
duties), that is not the case here. In advancing his breach of
contract claim against the Department, Horn relies solely on the
theory that the Personnel Act and the corresponding
adir-ini citrat-ive rules themselves formed a written contract.

(discussing legislative purpose of civil service systems and
stating that a primary goal is to enable governments "to render
more efficient services to the public by enabling them to obtain
efficient public servants").

The Personnel Act also charges the

director to:
develop and administer a program of personnel
management which will: (a) aid in the efficient
execution of public policy; (b) foster careers in
public service for qualified employees; and (c) render
assistance to state agencies in performing their
missions . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-6(1) (1986).
Rather than merely "flesh[ing] out" or "adding a layer of
protection" to a fundamentally contractual relationship, the
Personnel Act comprehensively defines the basic nature, terms and
conditions of career service employment with the state.

In so

doing, it advances important public policy as determined by the
legislature.

Therefore, issues concerning the employment rights

of a career service employee such as Horn are properly resolved
under the principles of statutory interpretation, rather than
contract law.5
Furthermore, as noted by the Wright court, the conclusion
that a civil servant's wrongful termination claim is statutory

5

Hom incorrectly asserts that before the enactment of the
Personnel Act, the relationship between the state and its
employees was contractual. The Personnel Act was preceded by the
Merit Systems Act, Utah Code Ann. § 67-13-1 to -15, which was
repealed in 1979 when the Personnel Act was enacted.
14

v

^v^

than contractual is consistent with the hold 3 ngs of courts

in other jurisdictions, which "have reasoned that tl le ter ms ai id
conditions of employment :i n the ci vil service are not determined
b y a w r i 11 e n con t r a c t b e t w e e 1 1 11 1 e S t:
the statutes and regulations of the appropriate agency or
age:. _ ^ ^

.

x ample,

in Personnel Division of the Executive Department v. St. Clair/
4 98 l 2 1 8 DS ( :: •. •

::: I

i | -j - ] 9 ; 2) , I .1 .•

1 I rejected the claim

of several state employees that a statu tor y amendment that
1 e n g t h e n e d 1:1 1 • = t i m • =; b e f o r e a required sal a ry review violated the
state constitutional provision against impairment 0: contracts.
The court stated,
Respondents' arguments concerni
.. CJ;._ = . --1
rights' and * impairment of the : _ ' j G . .n of
contracts,' in which they en.
r to apply the general
law of contracts to the present
e, are based on the
erroneous assumption that th~
luyment relationship
between the state of Oregon
ts civil service
employes [sic] arises out of, or results in, a contract
between the parties. The terms and conditions of civil
service employment are fixed by statute and the
regulations of the state personnel aaency f and not bv
"contract'' between the public employer and the
individual employee.
Id. at 811.
6

See also Miller v. State of California, 557 P.2d

As uuc Wngftt, ^v^
„
_i whether a state
employee's wrongful tei
..on clain. . . statutory or contractual
dees not often arise :n the context of a statute of limitations
question because such claims are ordinarily subject to an
exhaustion of remedies requirement. 881 P.2d at 573.
previously noted, Horn's failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies with the CSRB is an alternative ground for affirming the
deci s i on below
"-• — *- ~ 3 above,

970, 973-76 (Cal. 1977) (holding reduction of mandatory
retirement age for state employees did not impair vested
contractual rights, stating, "it is well settled in California
that public employment is not held by contract but by statute . .
. . " ) ; Bowman v. Maine State Employees Appeals Board/ 408 A.2d
688, 689-92 (Me. 1979) (rejecting claim of former state hospital
doctor that statutory declassification of his civil service
position violated contract clause of state and federal
constitutions); Wage Appeal of Montana State Highway Patrol
Officers v. Board of Personnel, 676 P.2d 194, 199 (Mont. 1984)
(rejecting claim that new state pay plan decreasing salaries for
highway patrol officers impaired the officers' contractual
rights, recognizing that "when the Legislature enacts a statute
fixing certain terms and conditions of public employment, such as
salaries and compensation, it is presumed that the statute does
not create contractual rights, but is intended merely to declare
a policy to be pursued until the Legislature declares otherwise);
Smith v. Citv of Newark, 320 A.2d 212, 219 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law
Div. 1974), reversed on other grounds 344 A.2d 782, 784 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (rejecting impairment of contracts claim
on ground that **the terms and conditions of public service in
office or employment rest in legislative policy rather than
contractual obligation, and hence may be changed except of course
insofar as the State Constitution specifically provides otherwise
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common law fraud action and was therefore subject to the
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limitations period for liabilities created by statute, rather
than the limitations period for common law fraud).
Without the provisions of the Personnel Act, career service
employees would be considered common law "at-will" employees, who
generally may be fired for any reason, or for no reason at all.
See Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah
1989) (recognizing rebuttable presumption that employment having
no specified duration may be terminated without just cause).
Accordingly, the Personnel Act is the source of the substantive
right on which Horn sues, and that right would not exist but for
the Personnel Act.

The just cause requirement which Horn seeks to

enforce was created solely by statute and would not exist at all
absent the statute.

Therefore, Horn's claim is statutory, rather

than contractual in nature.
B.

Cases Involving Governmental Employees Who Are
Exempt from the Civil Service Statutes, or Vested
Rights Are Inapposite to Horn's Wrongful
Termination Claim

None of the cases cited by Horn support the application of
contract law to his wrongful termination claim.

The Utah Supreme

Court's decision in Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College,
636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981) is inapplicable because it addressed
the wrongful termination claim of an exempt college employee
rather than a state career service employee such as Horn. In
Piacitelli, the court upheld the trial court's determination that
a college had substantially complied with the procedures required
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by its personnel manual ^n declining ^n renew the contract of a
non-tenure track counselor.
decision that the personnel manual governing the counselor's
employment
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P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995) ("Thurston II"), support Horn's cause
against the Department.

In Thurston II, the court followed law

of the case principles in upholding a trial court ruling that a
county had terminated a county road worker in violation of the
County Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-33-1 to -15
(1987).

Acknowledging that its decision in Thurston v. Box Elder

County, 835 P.2d 165 (1992) ("Thurston I"), an earlier appeal in
the same case, had "overstated the applicability of the [County
Personnel Management] Act to the County's personnel policies and
procedures," the court declined to remand the case for a
consideration of the evidence showing that the statute did not
apply to the county because it had too few employees.

Instead,

the court determined that the county personnel manual should be
interpreted to comport with the court's interpretation of the
statute from which the manual's language had been borrowed.

Id.

at 1039. Accordingly, the trial court's determination that the
county worker had been wrongfully terminated was correct, under
either the statute or the manual.
Horn inaccurately characterizes the Thurston II decision as
recognizing that the "nature of the relationship between a public
employee and his employer is contractual; not statutory."
Opening Brief of Appellant Horn, at 29. More accurately, the
court in Thurston II determined that it was unnecessary to decide
whether the statute applied because the terms of the statute and
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the personnel manual were the same, and the result would be the
same under either theory.
Indeed, the court's analysis in Thurston I soundly refutes
Horn's theory that a wrongful termination claim by a career
service employee is contractual rather than statutory.

Based on

the assumption (cast in doubt on the second appeal), that the
County Personnel Management Act governed the county worker's
employment, the court stated that the parties "have inaccurately
formulated the issues" in casting the case as a breach of
contract action based on the county's personnel manual.

835 P.2d

at 168. Although the parties had not addressed the County
Personnel Management Act, the court felt compelled to consider
the effect of the statute sua sponte "because it is controlling
and it would be contrary to public policy to decline to do so."
Id. at 168 n.3.

The court went on to reject the county's

argument that it properly terminated the worker because the
personnel manual required consideration of only two of the three
factors enumerated in the statute, stating, "Clearly the County
was not authorized to adopt a standard different from that found
in the statute." Id. at 168. The court further held that in
terminating the worker the county had improperly considered
additional factors not enumerated in the statute, stating that
the purpose of the statute "is to set a standard which county
employers must follow and upon which employees can rely
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....

Given this purpose, we hold that the statute precluded
consideration of factors not enumerated."

Id.

Assuming that the County Personnel Management Act was
applicable, the Thurston I court plainly viewed the county
worker's wrongful termination claim as statutory, rather than
contractual.

In this case, no doubt exists that the Personnel

Act governs Horn's claim.

Indeed, Horn expressly relies on the

Personnel Act and the administrative rules promulgated under the
Act as the basis of his claim.

As Thurston I demonstrates, a

wrongful termination claim under a civil service statute requires
consideration of the strong public policies advanced by the
statute.

Accordingly, such a claim is fundamentally statutory,

rather than contractual in nature.
Horn correctly points out that Utah courts, like many other
jurisdictions, treat vested public retirement benefits as
contractual obligations, but that narrow proposition fails to
support his assertion that the entire employment relationship is
contractual.

See, e.g., Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Board,

757 P.2d 882, 886 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (holding city attorney was
not deprived of vested contractual benefits when he failed to
satisfy conditions precedent to disability retirement benefits
because he did not become disabled or retired before the
legislature modified Disability Act).

Vested retirement and

similar employment benefits represent deferred compensation for
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services that have already been provided, and are therefore
deemed contractual.

Unlike an employee who has satisfied all the

requirements for the payment of a retirement benefit by providing
the required years of service and making the required
contributions, Hom has no vested right in continued civil service
employment.
Several courts have explained the distinction.

For example,

in Miller v. State, 557 P.2d 970 (Cal. 1977), the California
Supreme Court reasoned:
Plaintiff's reliance upon decisions concerning the
pension rights of public employees is misplaced . . . .
Pension rights, unlike tenure of civil service
employment, are deferred compensation earned
immediately upon the performance of services for a
public employer "and cannot be destroyed . . . without
impairing a contractual obligation. Thus the courts of
this state have refused to hold, in the absence of
special provision, that public employment establishes
tenure rights, but have uniformly held that pension
laws . . . establish contractual rights."
Id. at 973 (rejecting state employee's claim that legislation
reducing the age of mandatory retirement impaired his contractual
rights).

Similarly, agreeing that state civil service laws do

not create a contract between the state and its employees, the
Washington Supreme Court stated:
We adopt the [state's] position as the correct
statement of the law. The rights challenged here are
neither deferred benefits nor do they give rise to
contractual expectancies. Rather, the affected
provisions (certification, increment salary increases,
layoffs, and reemployment from layoffs) are best
categorized as terms of public employment (tenure) and
part of a system of personnel administration. Tenure
23

is regulated by legislative policy.
Washington Federation of State Employees v. State of Washington,
682 P.2d 869, 872 (Wash. 1984) (holding amendments to civil
service statute did not impair state employees contractual
rights).
In the same vein, the Maine Supreme Court rejected the claim
of a state hospital doctor that the statutory declassification of
his position impairs his contractual rights, stating, "It must be
remembered that we are not concerned with Dr. Bowman's right to
whatever emoluments he may be entitled to as a result of his
years of service.

We are concerned only with his right to

continue in his position as Superintendent of Pineland."

Bowman

v. Maine State Employees Appeal Bd., 408 A.2d 688, 691 (Me.
1979).

Similarly, the trial court was concerned only with Horn's

right to continued employment with the Department, not with his
retirement or other state benefits, and therefore correctly held
that Hom failed to state a claim for breach of contract.7

7

Hom points to occasional references in the administrative
rules of the Department of Human Resource Management to
"agreements" or "contracts" with employees concerning matters
such as telecommuting and overtime payment options to support his
contention that his relationship with the defendant Department
was contractual. Opening Brf. of Hom at 27, referring to R. at
620. This analysis has several flaws. First, the rules to which
Hom points were not adopted in 1992, well after Horn's employment
was terminated in March 1990. Second, none of the identified
rules concern grounds for termination of employment. Third, some
of the rules apply to exempt employees, rather than career
service employees.
24

C.

No Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Existed
Between Horn and the Department

Horn's allegation of breach of an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing adds nothing to his wrongful termination
claim against the Department.

As discussed above, Horn had no

employment contract with the Department, and therefore no
contract into which such a covenant may be implied.

In addition,

the alleged obligation of good faith and fair dealing simply
restates the obligation already imposed on the Department by the
Personnel Act and corresponding administrative rules. Moreover,
like his contract claim, Horn's breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is barred for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.

See note 3 above. As stated by the

court in Valenzuela v. State, 240 Cal. Rptr. 45, 48 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987), "We hold Valenzuela's claim for a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing simply restates
the obligation of the State to deal fairly and in good faith with
its employees as required by statute and administrative rules,
and remedies for breach of that obligation are in the
administrative procedures provided by the State civil service
system, [the employee plaintiff's] exclusive remedy as a State
civil service employee.fl8
8

Because Horn asserts only the existence of an express
written contract, his citation of a series of Michigan cases
grappling inconclusively with the issue of whether a public
employer may create an implied-in-fact contract is inapposite.
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D.

Conclusion

In sum, Horn relies exclusively on the Personnel Act and its
corresponding administrative rules in advancing his claim that
the Department wrongfully terminated his employment.

His claim

necessarily involves the interpretation and application of
statutory law.

The cases on which Horn relies are inapposite

because they involve vested rights or governmental employees who
are exempt or otherwise not covered by civil service statutes.
Horn failed to commence his wrongful termination claim within the
three-year period allowed for statutory claims. Accordingly, the
trial court correctly held that Horn failed to state a claim for
breach of a written contract against the Department, and this
Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of Horn's breach
of contract claim.9

See Bennett v. Marshall Public Library, 746 F. Supp. 671 (W.D.
Mich. 1990); Merrell v. Bav County Metropolitan Trans. Auth., 707
F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Thorin v. Bloomfield Hills Board
of Education, 513 N.W.2d 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Manning v.
Citv of Hazel Park, 509 N.W. 2d 874 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
9

The dismissal of Horn's claim may also be affirmed on the
alternative ground that it is barred by the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38 (1993 & Supp.
1997). First, Horn never filed a notice of claim describing the
nature of his claims as statutory as required by section 63-3011(3) (a) (ii). R. 1087-90. See Yearslev v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127
(Utah 1990) (notice of claim for physical and emotional distress
from alleged assault and battery insufficient to preserve claim
for malicious prosecution). Second, although the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act waives immunity for contractual
obligations, no such waiver applies to Horn's statutory claim.
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1) (1993) (retaining immunity except
as expressly provided in statute).
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Point II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED HOM'S
FEDERAL DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CLAIM AS
BARRED BY THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS
This Court should affirm the dismissal of Horn's federal
disability discrimination claim against the Defendants because
the applicable four-year limitations period had expired when Horn
filed his initial complaint in this case, and because no
circumstances exist to warrant application of the discovery rule.
Disability discrimination claims under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act are subject to the limitations period for
personal injury claims under state law.

See Baker v. Board of

Regents of State of Kansas, 991 F.2d 628, 631-32 (10th Cir.
1993).

Accordingly, the four-year limitations period for

personal injury claims in Utah applies to Horn's disability
discrimination claim under section 504.

See Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-12-25(3) (1996) (1996 amendment made stylistic changes).
Under the ordinary rule that a personal injury action
accrues when the injury occurs, Horn's disability discrimination
claim accrued, at the very latest, on the date his employment was
terminated on March 1, 1990.
468 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

See Jepson v. State, 846 P.2d 485,

Horn's amended complaint in which he
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first asserted his disability discrimination claim in this case
and which was filed on March 6, 1995, was filed too late.

Even

assuming, however, that Horn's amended complaint related-back to
March 24, 1994, when he filed his original complaint in this
case, Horn's disability discrimination claim was untimely and is
therefore barred.10
Horn's alleged unawareness until August 1994 that several
Department employees believed that he was emotionally or mentally
unstable does not support the application of the discovery rule
to toll the limitations period for his disability discrimination
claim.

Generally, "simple ignorance or obliviousness to the

existence of a cause of action will not prevent the running of
the statute of limitations." Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Rather, the
discovery rule applies in three situations:
(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated
by statute; (2) in situations where a plaintiff does
not become aware of the cause of action because of the
10

The federal court denied Horn leave to file an amended
complaint to allege a disability discrimination claim because the
proposed amendment was untimely and prejudicial, and because the
statute of limitations had expired and the claim did not relateback to the filing of his original federal complaint. R. 418.
That decision was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
on the ground of untimeliness alone, without reaching the
relation-back issue. See Horn v. Squire. 81 F.3d 969 (10th Cir.
1996). Accordingly, Horn's relation-back argument is precluded
under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Because Horn's claim
is barred by the statute of limitations in any event, however,
this Court need not reach the collateral estoppel or relationback issue.
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defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3)
in situations where the case presents exceptional
circumstances and the application of the general rule
would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any
showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery
of the cause of action.
Id.
Contrary to Horn's contention, neither the fraudulent
concealment nor the exceptional circumstances versions of the
discovery rule applies here because Horn has failed to make the
required threshold showing that he did not know and could not
reasonably have discovered the facts underlying his disability
discrimination claim in time to bring an action. See Walker Drug
Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1231-32 (Utah 1995).
Ordinarily,

lfl

[a]ll that is required [to trigger the statute of

limitations] is . . . sufficient information to apprise [the
plaintiffs of the underlying cause of action] so as to put them
on notice to make further inquiry if they harbor doubts or
questions" about the defendant's actions.f" Berenda v. Lanaford,
914 P.2d 45, 51 (Utah 1996) (quoting United Park Citv Mines Co.
v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 889 (Utah 1993))
(modifications in original).
Horn has failed to show that he had insufficient information
to put him on notice to make further inquiry about the
perceptions of his behavior.

Horn's disability discrimination

claim is based on the allegation that in terminating his
employment, the Defendants discriminated against him because they
29

perceived that he was mentally unstable.

Horn contends that he

was unaware of the Defendants' alleged perception until August
1994 when he deposed several Department employees in his federal
action and, in response to questioning, they revealed their
perceptions of Horn's emotional state and behavior.
Even under Horn's version of the facts, the events leading up
to Horn's involuntary termination and the stated reasons for that
termination gave Horn ample notice of the possibility that the
Defendants regarded him as mentally unstable.

For example, Horn

reports experiencing deteriorating relationships with his coworkers, Opening Brief of Appellant Horn at 11, being the subject
of an internal affairs investigation, id. at 12, experiencing
extreme stress and pressure from being overworked, .id. at 13,
being banned from the third floor of his building where the
Driver's License Division was located, id. at 14, having his
supervisor tape record his conversations with Horn, id. at 19,
having his security clearance revoked, id. at 20, and breaking
down and crying uncontrollably during a meeting with the chief of
the Bureau of Criminal Investigations.

Ld.

These circumstances

strongly suggest that Department employees believed Horn was
unstable.

Indeed, awareness of these facts probably prompted

Horn's attorney to probe the topic of the employees' perceptions
of Horn's emotional and mental state at their depositions.
Moreover, the stated reasons for Horn's involuntary
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termination—that Horn was perceived to be a security threat, that
he had committed perjury, and that he had been insubordinate—
also strongly suggest that the Defendants believed Horn to be
mentally disturbed or unstable, and placed Horn on notice to
inquire further.

Thus, Horn failed to show that he had

insufficient information to put him on notice to make further
inquiry.
In addition, Horn failed to establish a prima facie case that
the Defendants fraudulently concealed Horn's claim.

When a

plaintiff alleges that a defendant "took affirmative steps to
conceal" the cause of action, the "plaintiff can avoid the full
operation of the discovery rule by making a prima facie showing
of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrating that given the
defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have
discovered the claim earlier."
51 (Utah 1996).

Berenda v. Lancrford, 914. P.2d 45,

The fact that the Defendants may have believed

that Horn was mentally unstable does not, as Horn suggests,
automatically establish that the Defendants involuntarily
terminated Horn's employment because of his mental instability.11
n

Under the American With Disabilities Act, the successor
statute to the Rehabilitation Act, an employer "must tolerate
eccentric or unusual conduct caused by an employee's disability
so long as the employee can satisfactorily perform the essential
functions of his job," Hartoa v. Wasatch Academy, 1997 LEXIS
29792 *39 (10th Cir. as corrected December 15, 1997). However,
"an employer may take action against an employee who poses a
'direct threat' to the health or safety of other individuals in
the workplace." Id* at *35. Thus, an employer may be required
31

Thus, contrary to Horn's suggestion, the Defendants1 consistent
position in their discovery responses that they terminated Horn
because of insubordination, perjury, and threats to state
security, does not constitute fraudulent concealment of the
factual basis for Horn's disability discrimination claim.
Moreover, even if Horn had established a prima facie case of
fraudulent concealment, it is apparent that Horn could easily have
discovered earlier the Defendants' perception of his mental state
simply by diligently pursuing his claims, either before the CSRB
or the federal district court.

To take advantage of the

discovery rule, a plaintiff who has established a prima facie
case of fraudulent concealment must still demonstrate that "given
the defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have
discovered the claim earlier."

Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51.

Although such an inquiry is normally a question of fact, summary
judgment is proper "when the facts are so clear that reasonable
persons could not disagree about the underlying facts or about
the application of the governing legal standard to the facts."
Id. at 54.
As both the federal district court and court of appeals made
clear, Horn was far from diligent in pursuing his claims either in

tc relax workplace rules concerning neatness or courtesy where a
mentally disabled employee's job does not involve interaction
with others, but may uniformly enforce rules prohibiting violence
or the threat of violence in the workplace, regardless of whether
such behavior is caused by a mental disability.
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the CSRB or in federal court.

R. 403-05 (Addendum B) and Horn v.

Sauire, 81 F.3d 969, 973 (10th Cir. 1996).

Moreover, when Horn

finally deposed several Department employees in August 1994—over
four years after Horn was terminated and nearly three years after
he commenced his federal action—they freely revealed their
perceptions of Horn's mental instability, despite the continued
threat of liability from Horn's claims.

Contrary to Horn's

suggestion, witnesses who testify truthfully under the threat of
litigation are not necessarily "foolish," and fraudulent
concealment may not reasonably be inferred from the existence of
such a threat alone. Accordingly, the trial court properly
granted summary judgment against Horn on the ground that
reasonable persons could not disagree that given the Defendants'
conduct, Horn's alleged failure to discover his cause of action
was unreasonable.
Finally, Horn's allegation that the concealment exception
applies here should also be rejected on the ground that "*the
facts underlying the allegation of fraudulent concealment are so
tenuous, vague, or insufficiently established that they fail to
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to concealment.'" Id.;
see also Anderson, 920 P.2d at 580. Horn has failed to set forth
anything more than vague innuendo in support of his allegations
of fraudulent concealment. Accordingly, the trial court properly
granted summary judgment to the Defendants on the ground that the
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limitations period had run on Horn's disability discrimination
claim.12
CONCLUSION
Hom failed to commence his suit against the Defendants
within the limitation periods applicable to his claims.

Hom had

no written employment contract with the Department, and his claim
is properly characterized as statutory, rather than contractual.
The discovery rule does not apply to his federal disability
discrimination claim.

The trial court properly granted summary

judgment against Horn, and this Court should affirm the judgment
of dismissal in its entirety.
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12

Because the limitations period clearly barred Horn's claim,
this Court need not address Horn's arguments that the decision in
his federal case did not collaterally estop him from claiming
that his amended complaint in this case related-back to his
original complaint, and that he stated a proper disability
discrimination claim.
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January, 1998, to:

ADDENDUM A

UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-2 (1986)
67-19-2. Policy of state.
(1) It is the policy of this state that the governor be responsible for the
administration of the personnel system and that the governor direct the system in a manner that will provide for the effective implementation of the
policies and programs under the governor's direction.
(2) It is the policy of this state that the Utah state personnel system be
administered on behalf of the governor by a strong central personnel agency.
Any delegation of personnel functions should be according to standards and
guidelines determined by the central personnel agency and should be carefully monitored by it.
(3) It is the policy of this state that comparative merit or achievement
govern the selection and advancement of employees in Utah state government
and that employees be rewarded for performance in a manner that will encourage excellence and strengthen the system.
(4) It is the policy of this state to provide for equal employment opportunity
by ensuring that all personnel actions including hire, tenure or term, and
condition or privilege of employment be based on the ability to perform the
duties and responsibilities assigned to a particular position without regard to
age, race, creed or religion, color, handicap, sex, national origin, ancestry or
political affiliation.
(5) It is the policy of this state, if there are substantial disparities between
the proportions of members of racial, ethnic, gender or handicap groups in
state employment and the proportions of such groups in the labor force in this
state, to take affirmative action to ensure that members of the groups have
the opportunity to apply and be considered for available positions in state
government.
(6) It is the policy of this state to ensure its employees opportunities for
satisfying careers and fair treatment based on the value of each employee's
services.
(7) It is the policy of this state to provide a formal procedure for processing
the appeals and grievances of state employees without discrimination, coercion, restraint or reprisal.
History: C. 1953, 67-19-2, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 139, * S.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-15 (1986)

67-19-15. Coverage of career service provisions.
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law or by rules and regulations promulgated for federally aided programs, the following positions shall be exempt
from the career service provisions of this chapter:
(a) the governor, members of the Legislature, and all other elected
state officers;
(b) persons appointed to fill vacancies in elective positions, employees
of the state Legislature, employees of the state judiciary, members of
boards and commissions, and heads of departments appointed by the governor, state and local officials serving ex officio, and members of state and
local boards and councils appointed by the governing bodies of the departments;
(c) all employees and officers in the office and at the residence of the
governor;
(d) those employees who make final policy decisions, including all
heads of departments, agencies, and major offices; those heads of subordinate units whose duties have a direct and substantial effect on the public
relations of state administration generally; those employees whose regular duties include public advocacy and defense of administration policy;
and those in a personal and confidential relationship to elected officials
and to heads of departments, agencies, and other major offices. All positions designated as being exempt under this subsection shall be listed in
the rules promulgated under this act by the job title and department or
agency and any change in exempt status shall constitute an amendment
to the rules;
(e) unskilled employees in positions requiring little or no specialized
skill or training. A roster of all such positions showing job title, number of
positions, and department or agency shall be maintained by the director
of personnel management on a current basis and the roster shall be available for public review;
(f) part-time professional noncareer persons, who are paid for any form
of medical and other professional service, and who are not engaged in the
performance of administrative duties;
(g) officers, faculty, and other employees of state universities and other
state institutions of higher education;
(h) teaching staff of all state institutions, and patients and inmates
employed in state institutions;
(i) persons employed in a professional or scientific capacity to make or
conduct a temporary and special inquiry, investigation, or examination
on behalf of the Legislature or a legislative committee or by authority of
the governor;
0') noncareer employees compensated for their services on a seasonal or
contractual basis who are hired for limited periods of less than nine consecutive months, or who are employed on less than one-half time basis;
and
(k) all employees of the Utah Housing Finance Agency.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-15 (1986)
(Continued)

(2) The civil service shall consist of two schedules, as follows:
(a) schedule A — The exempted schedule made under Subsection (1).
Removalfromany appointive position under schedule A, unless otherwise
regulated by law, shall be at the pleasure of the appointing officers without regard to tenure; and
(b) schedule B — The competitive career service schedule, consisting of
all positionsfilledthrough competitive selection procedures as defined by
the director.
(3) The director, after consultation with the heads of concerned departments and agencies, and with the approval of the governor, shall allocate
positions to the appropriate schedules under this section.
(4) Requests to change the schedule assignment and tenure rights of any
position shall be made by an agency head to the director, whose decision shall
befinal,subject only to the governor's review in cases of denial of an agency's
request by the director.
(5) All employees of the office of lieutenant governor, the office of state
auditor, the office of state treasurer, the attorney general's office, excluding
attorneys who are under their own career service system, and employees who
are not exempt under this section shall be covered by the career service provisions of this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 67-19-15, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 139, § 21; L. 1983, ch. 332, fi 7;
1985, ch. 203, i 11; 1985 (1st S.S.), ch. 4,
i 18.
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amendment reduced the number of schedules from
three to two in Subsection (2); substituted "selection procedures as defined by the director"
for "examination, written or unwritten, and to
which tenure shall apply following a probationary period, subject to the availability of
funds and continued need for the position" in
-Subsection (2Kb); deleted Subsection (2)(c) concerning the noncompetitive schedule; deleted
"of personnel management** after "director" in
Subsection (3); substituted "lieutenant governor" for "secretary of state" in Subsection (5);
and made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation.

The 1985 amendment by ch. 203 deleted
"and regulations" after "rules" in two places in
the last sentence of Subsection (IKd); inserted
"who are under their own career service system" in Subsection (5); and made minor
changes in phraseology.
The 1985 (1st S.S.) amendment substituted
"chapter" for "act" in Subsection (1); inserted
Subsection (l)(k); substituted "chapter" for
"act" in Subsection (5); and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation.
Meaning of "this act". — See note under
same catchline following I 67-19-11.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-18 (1986)

67-19-18. Dismissals and demotions — Grounds — Disciplinary action — Procedure — Reductions in
force.
(1) Dismissals or demotions of career service employees shall only be to
advance the good of the public interest, and for such just causes as inefficiency, incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate performance
levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance,
malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office. There shall be no dismissal for reasons
of race, sex, age, physical handicap, national origin, religion, political affiliation, or other non-merit factor including the exercise of rights under this
chapter. The director shall promulgate rules governing the procedural and
documentary requirements of disciplinary dismissals and demotions.
(2) If an agency headfindsthat a career service employee is charged with
aggravated misconduct or that retention of a career service employee would
endanger the peace and safety of others or pose a grave threat to the public
interest, the employee may be suspended pending the administrative appeal
to the department head as provided in Subsection (3).
(3) No person shall be demoted or dismissed from a career service position
unless the department head or designated representative has observed the
following procedures:
(a) The department head or designated representative notifies the employee in writing of the reasons for the dismissal or demotion;
(b) The employee has no less than five working days to reply and have
the reply considered by the department head;
(c) The employee has an opportunity to be heard by the department
head or designated representative; and
(d) Following the hearing an employee may be dismissed or demoted if
the department head finds adequate cause or reason.
(4) Reductions in force required by inadequate funds, change of workload,
or lack of work shall be governed by retention rosters established by the
director. Under such circumstances:
(a) The agency head shall designate the category of work to be eliminated, subject to review by the director;
(b) Temporary and probationary workers shall be separated before any
tenured employee;
(c) Retention points for each tenured employee shall be computed according to rules promulgated by the director allowing appropriate consideration for proficiency and for seniority in state government, including
any active duty military service fulfilled subsequent to original state
appointment. Tenured employees shall be separated in the order of their
retention points, the employee with the lowest points to be discharged
first; and
(d) A career service employee who is separated in a reduction in force
shall be placed on the reappointment roster provided for in Subsection
67-19-17(2), and shall be reappointed without examination to any va-

UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-18 (1986)
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cancy for which the employee is qualified which occurs within one year of
the date of the separation.
(e) An employee separated due to a reduction in force may appeal to the
department head for an administrative review. The notice of appeal must
be submitted within 20 working days after the employee's receipt of written notification of separation. The employee may appeal the decision of
the department head according to the grievance and appeals procedure of
this act.
History: C. 1953, 67-lft-18, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 139, | 24; L. 1983, ch. 332, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amendment deleted "where funds have expired or
work no longer exists" in the first sentence of
Subsection (1); deleted "of personnel" after "director" in the last sentence of Subsection (1);
deleted "of personnel management" after "director" in Subsection (4); added Subsection
(4)(e); and made minor changes in phraseology
and punctuation.
Meaning of n this act". — The term "this

act," referred to in the last sentence in Subsection (4)(e), literally means Laws 1983, ch. 332,
§§ 1 to 9, which appear as various sections
throughout this chapter (see Table of Session
Laws in Parallel Tables volume). However,
given the context in which it is used, it seems
that the term is meant to refer to Laws 1979,
ch. 139, §§ 1 to 35. See note under same catchline following f 67-19-11.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(3) (1996)

78-12-25. Within four years.
An action may be brought within four years:
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an open
account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished;
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last
payment is received;
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections
of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1);
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, { 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, § 14; 1996,
ch. 79, § 110.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, in the introductory paragraph, substituted "An action may be
brought within'* for 'Within"; deleted "An ac-

tion" at the beginning of Subsections (1) and (3);
and made stylistic changes.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26(4) (1996)

78-12*26. Within three years.
An action may be brought within three years:
(1) for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; except that
when waste or trespass is committed by means of underground works
upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not accrue until the
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such waste or
trespass;
(2) for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions for specific recovery thereof; except that in all cases where the
subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in the term
"livestock,* which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if
the animal strayed or was stolenfromthe true owner without the owner's
fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the
possession of the animal by the defendant;
(3) for relief on the ground offraudor mistake; except that the cause of
action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved
party of the facts constituting thefraudor mistake;
(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a
penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where in special
cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state;
(5) to enforce liability imposed by Section 78-17-3, except that the cause
of action does not accrue until the aggrieved party knows or reasonably
should know of the harm suffered.
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, { 1; a 1943,
8uppM 104-12-26; L. 1986, ch. 143, ft 1; 1996,
eh. 79,ft111.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective April 29,1996, in the introductory paragraph, substituted "An action may be
Brought within* for •Within"; deleted *An action" at the beginning of Subsections (1) to (5);
and made stylistic changes.

ADDENDUM B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
Michael Horn,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

:

A. Roland Squire, Arthur J.
Hudachko, Douglas Bodrero, and
John Does 1-10.
Defendants.

Case No. 91-C-1016W
;
:

This matter is before the court on Defendants A. Roland
Squire ("Squire"), Arthur J. Hudachko, and Douglas Bodrero's
("Bodrero") (collectively "defendants") Motion for Summary
Judgment.1
1994.

A hearing on the motion was held on November 22,

The defendants were represented by J. Mark Ward.

Plaintiff Michael Hom ("Horn") was represented by L. Zane Gill
("Gill").

Before the hearing, the court considered carefully the

memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties.

Since

taking the matter under advisement, the court has further
considered the law and facts relating to the Motion for Summary

1

Defendants were employees of the Utah Department of
Public Safety at times relevant to the facts alleged in the
complaint.

Judgment.

Now being fully advised, the court renders the

following Memorandum Decision and Order.
I.

BACKGROUND

This action arose out of the termination of Horn's
employment with the Utah Department of Public Safety ("DPS"),
where he worked as a computer programmer/analyst.
Horn for three enumerated reasons:

DPS terminated

(1) insubordination; (2)

perjury; and (3) making threats against, and thus becoming a
perceived security risk to, DPS's law enforcement related
computer files.

In his complaint, Horn alleges these are not the

true reasons he was fired.

Instead, he asserts he was terminated

in retaliation for speaking out on certain matters.
Specifically, he alleges this occurred "because of his vocalized
and written concerns about the [DPS computer vendor] selection
committee practices, compensation time violations and his
grieving . . . letters of reprimand issued to him."
% 82.)

(Am. Compl.

Horn also alleges the defendants deprived him of a liberty

interest without due process of law.

Specifically, he alleges

DPS employees informed personnel at two other government agencies
of the problems they perceived with Horn without affording him a
constitutionally adequate opportunity to clear his name.

2

tons?

The defendants have moved for summary judgment, arguing
that Horn was not terminated for speaking out on the above
matters, and that in any event such speech is not protected under
the First Amendment-

The defendants also argue that Horn had a

constitutionally sufficient opportunity to clear his name.

In

response, Horn maintains that there are disputed issues of
material fact that preclude this court from granting the
defendants' motion on both issues.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
56(c).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

In applying this standard, the court must construe all

facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp.. 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Wright v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.. 925 F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1991).
Once the moving party has carried its burden, Rule
56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings
and by . . . affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to
3
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interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate "specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'"

Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Gonzales v. Millers
Casualty Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1417, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991) .2 The
nonmoving party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."
Celotex Corp.. 477 U.S. at 322.
In considering whether there exist genuine issues of
material fact, the court does not weigh the evidence but instead
inquires whether a reasonable jury, faced with the evidence
presented, could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986);
Clifton v. Craig. 924 F.2d 182, 183 (10th Cir.), cert, denied,
112 S. Ct. 97 (1991).3

Finally, all material facts asserted by

the moving party shall be deemed admitted unless specifically
controverted by the opposing party.

D. Utah R. 202(b) (4) .

2

The summary judgment motion may be "opposed by any of
the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except
the mere pleadings themselves." Celotex Corp. 477 U.S. at 324.
3

"The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the [nonmoving party's] position will be
insufficient." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.
4
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III.

DISCUSSION

"[lit has been settled that a State cannot condition
public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's
constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.11
Connick v. Mvers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) . In vindicating
public employees' free speech rights, the Supreme Court has
sought to balance "'the interests of the [employee], as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.'"

Id. (quoting Pickering v. Board of Education. 391

U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).

Absent unusual circumstances, the Court

has indicated that when employee expression is not on a matter of
public concern, "government officials should enjoy wide latitude
in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the
judiciary in the name of the First Amendment."

Id. at 147.

The parties dispute whether Horn's speech involved
matters of public concern.

Employee expression involves a matter

of public concern if it can "be fairly considered as relating to
any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community."

Id. at 146.

Horn asserts he was terminated in

retaliation for written and oral statements concerning his
5
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compensation time, his grievances, and the DPS computer vendor
selection committee practices.
The first two items do not involve matters of public
concern, but rather involve matters of personal interest and the
internal affairs of DPS.
First Amendment.

Thus, they are not protected by the

See, e.g., Save v. St. Vrain Valley School

Dist. RE-1J. 785 F.2d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 1986) (teacher's
complaint that school district cut back on aide time did not go
to aide time allocated generally, but only that allocated to her
and thus did not address a matter of public concern); Sipes v.
United States, 744 F.2d 1418, 1423 (10th Cir. 1984) (Air Force
employee's statement that he was cited for infractions, while
others committing the same infractions were not cited, involved
personnel actions affecting only his own employment and therefore
did not touch on matters of public concern); Schmidt v. Fremont
County Sch. Dist. No. 25, 558 F.2d 982, 984-85 (10th Cir. 1977)
(high school principal's statements concerning career education
and football seating practices were part of his official
functions and were related to internal affairs of school system
and thus not subject to First Amendment protection).
His statements alleging inappropriate and illegal
conduct on the part of DPS employees involved with the computer
6
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selection committee, however, arguably touch on a matter of
public concern because the committee is involved in government
procurement.

On the other hand, the committee's discussions as

to what type of computer vendor can best serve DPS's needs may
properly be considered part of the internal affairs of DPS and
thus not implicate the First Amendment.
Yet even if Horn's speech concerning the selection
committee practices is considered to involve matters of public
concern, Horn must demonstrate a causal connection between such
speech and his termination.

Save, 785 F.2d at 866.

After

reviewing all of the evidence in the record, it is the opinion of
this court that Horn has made an insufficient showing that he was
terminated for the speech in question.
Essentially, the remainder of Horn's retaliation claim
consists of a recitation of his protestations of alleged illegal
and improper actions of DPS employees during the selection
process.

He then lists several subsequent incidents, including

disciplinary actions initiated against him, and summarily states
that the described incidents occurred because he spoke out
against the handling of the selection process.

Horn has done

little more than make bald assertions of belief regarding the
requisite nexus in his memorandum and his affidavit, both of
7
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which are filled with what amounts to largely unsubstantiated
speculation as to the reasons for his termination.
The timing of Horn's termination also casts doubt on
whether Horn could carry his burden of proof on the causation
issue.
88.

The computer vendor selection process occurred in 1987-

It was not until November of 1989, however, that the DPS

sent Horn a letter notifying him of its intent to terminate his
employment.

This action was prompted by a memo drafted by Squire

on October 31, 1989 in which he requested that Horn be terminated
because he was a security risk, insubordinate, and had committed
perjury.

Not only was the alleged retaliation for his speech

delayed for at least a year, but Squire, the person who initially
requested Horn's termination, was not a DPS employee during the
time of the selection process.
As indicated above, to demonstrate that there is a
genuine issue of material fact, the evidence must be such that a
reasonable fact finder could find for Horn. See Liberty Lobby,
477 U.S. at 249; Clifton. 924 F.2d at 183.

The causal connection

here is simply too tenuous to pass that test.

Therefore, the

defendants' motion for summary judgment on this issue is

8
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granted.4
The liberty interest Horn claims the defendants
infringed is that in his reputation and also in his ability to
secure employment in his chosen occupation.5

Because the claim

is for a constitutional deprivation made against state actors,6
Horn must show more than-simple defamation to prevail at trial.
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-10 (1976).
plus."

He must show "stigma

Neu v. Corcoran, 869 F.2d 662, 667 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989).
such a claim as follows:

Courts have defined the elements of

(1) the defamation must occur in the

course of the termination of employment; (2) the government
officials' statements must be stigmatizing or attach a badge of
shame to the employee being terminated, thereby impairing the
employee's ability to pursue future employment; (3) the
statements must be false; (4) the statements must have been made
4

Because Horn has failed to carry his burden on the
causation issue, the defendants' burden to show they would have
reached the same decision in the aibsence of Horn's speaking out is
not triggered. See Save, 785 F.2d at 866.
5

Horn concedes that he has not raised a claim based on
the taking of a property interest without due process of law.
(PL's Supp. Mem. Opp. at 3.).
6

Actually, although Horn apparently seeks to implicate
all of the defendants in this claim, the record only supports an
arguable claim against Squire. (See, e.g.. Horn Aff. %% 61-63.)
9
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granted.4
The liberty interest Horn claims the defendants
infringed is that in his reputation and also in his ability to
secure employment in his chosen occupation-5

Because the claim

is for a constitutional deprivation made against state actors,6
Horn must show more than simple defamation to prevail at trial.
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-10 (1976).
plus."

He must show "stigma

Neu v. Corcoran, 869 F.2d 662, 667 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989).
such a claim as follows:

Courts have defined the elements of

(1) the defamation must occur in the

course of the termination of employment; (2) the government
officials' statements must be stigmatizing or attach a badge of
shame to the employee being terminated, thereby impairing the
employee's ability to pursue future employment; (3) the
statements must be false; (4) the statements must have been made
4

Because Horn has failed to carry his burden on the
causation issue, the defendants' burden to show they would have
reached the same decision in the absence of Horn's speaking out is
not triggered. See Save. 785 F.2d at 866.
5

Horn concedes that he has not raised a claim based on
the taking of a property interest without due process of law.
(PL's Supp. Mem. Opp. at 3.).
6

Actually, although Horn apparently seeks to implicate
all of the defendants in this claim, the record only supports an
arguable claim against Squire. (See, e.g.. Horn Aff. %% 61-63.)
9
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public; and, if the first three elements are met, (4) the
employee did not have a meaningful opportunity to clear the
employee's name,

Paul, 424 U.S. at 710; Board of Regents v.

Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1971); Wisconsin v. Constantineau. 400
U.S. 433, 437-39 (1971); JJeu, 869 F.2d at 667-69; Asbill v.
Housing Auth.. 726 F.2d 1499, 1503-04 (10th Cir. 1984).

Even

assuming Horn could make out the first three elements, the
evidence in the record currently before the court clearly
establishes that he cannot satisfy the fourth element.

The

record amply reflects that Horn had a constitutionally sufficient
opportunity to clear his name through the administrative process
in his agency and through appellate procedures available in the
Utah courts.
The procedures available to Horn are summarized as
follows.

On October 31, 1989, Squire wrote a detailed memo to

Brant Johnson ("Johnson"), a Deputy Commissioner of DPS.

Squire

requested that Horn be terminated because Squire perceived him to
be a security risk.

Squire also stated in the memo that he had

evidence that Horn had lied under oath in an administrative
proceeding, and that he judged Horn's conduct to be insubordinate.
On November 13, 1989, Johnson sent Horn a letter stating it was
the intent of the DPS to sever its employment relationship with
10
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Horn. The letter described the reasons for this action and also
stated Horn would be contacted by an administrative law judge to
set a time, date, and place for a pre-termination hearing.
On December 7, 1989, Gill, who was then representing
Horn, wrote to an employee of DPS that the first days he would be
available for the hearing would be December 13, 14, or 15. Gill
specifically waived the apparent administrative rule that such
hearings be held within ten days.

He made a request for

administrative discovery and also acknowledged that the hearing
would be a de novo review of the decision to terminate Horn's
employment.

If the administrative law judge ruled adverse to

Horn, his next recourse would be to Bodrero, who was the
Commissioner of DPS.
Subsequently, Gill met with Bodrero, and indicated he
wanted to bypass the de novo evidentiary hearing and instead
preferred to submit written argument directly to Bodrero.

On

December 14, Bodrero wrote Gill to confirm what they discussed at
the meeting.7
7

Bodrero ordered a DPS employee to provide Gill

Bodrero also wrote:
As I said in our meeting, I am
disappointed that you have chosen not to
avail yourself of the opportunity to
participate in the evidentiary hearing
11
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with the specific information supporting the intent to dismiss
letter, per Gill's request.

Gill then had five days to respond

in writing to this information.

Bodrero would then conduct his

own investigation into the matter.

On December 21, Johnson sent

Gill a detailed letter describing the reasons supporting the
intent to terminate letter.

On January 8, 1990, Gill responded

to the allegations contained in Johnson's December 21
correspondence with a nineteen page letter, not including
exhibits.

On January 18, 1990, Bodrero informed Gill of his

decision to terminate Hom, effective that day.
On January 19, Gill wrote to Bodrero that he was
interested in working out an agreement whereby Hom could return
to his job with DPS.

Ten days later, Hom himself sent notice to

the Utah State Career Service Review Board ("CSRB") that he was
appealing Bodrero's termination decision.

Applicable procedures

process that usually takes place prior to the
time I am asked to make a decision on an
employee dismissal case. The purpose of the
evidentiary hearing would have been to
provide me with a more complete picture of
this matter prior to my having to decide it.
Since you have chosen to bypass the
evidentiary hearing, I consider the process
described above as the next best way to
proceed.
The "process" referred to is described below.
12
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provided that the CSRB would hear this appeal and conduct a de
novo evidentiary review on matters relating to Horn's termination.
However, the decision to terminate Horn had apparently been
revoked pending settlement discussions, but the discussions were
not fruitful and on March 8, 1990, Bodrero sent Horn a final
termination letter, noting that Gill had refused an offer of
settlement.

Bodrero advised in his letter that Horn had the right

to appeal his decision to the CSRB.
Gill sent a notice of appeal to the CSRB and requested
the de novo evidentiary hearing at the earliest opportunity.
hearing was scheduled for April 23-24, 1990.

The

However, a few days

before the hearing, Gill moved for a continuance.

The hearing

was continued without a date. Horn v. Administrative Servs. Div.,
No. 8 CSRB/H.O. 106 (Utah C.S.R.B. Apr. 18, 1990) (notice of
continuance).

On October 30, 1990, the CSRB wrote Gill,

believing that Horn had filed suit and asked Gill what his
intentions were vis-a-vis continuing the grievance procedure.
Gill responded that Horn had not yet filed suit, but requested an
indefinite stay of the grievance proceedings pending the outcome
of the litigation he implied he would file.
Approximately two and one-half years later, the CSRB
entered an order dismissing Horn's appeal of Bodrero's decision.
13
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The basis for the dismissal was Horn's failure to prosecute. Horn
v. Administrative Servs. Div.. No. 8 CSRB/H.O. 106 (Utah C.S.R.B.
Apr. 8, 1993) (order and final agency action dismissing appeal).
The order was issued after the CSRB had entered an Order to Show
Cause Why Appeal Should not be Dismissed, issued December 8, 1992
and the CSRB's subsequent Order and Notice Setting Forth Deadline
for Dismissal if Case not Timely Prosecuted, issued January 28,
1993.

Id.

The CSRB's January 28 Order directed Horn to request

the CSRB to schedule an evidentiary hearing on or before March
31, 1993, or Horn's appeal would be dismissed.

Horn apparently

failed to do so, and thus his appeal was dismissed.

The Utah

Court of Appeals subsequently upheld the CSRB's action.

Horn v.

Administrative Servs. Div.. No. 930307-CA (Utah Ct. App. Aug. 19,
1993) (per curiam).
As the above reference to procedures available to Horn
amply demonstrates, Horn was afforded substantial pre- and posttermination procedural safeguards.

Before he was officially

terminated he was given notice of the allegations against him and
chose to challenge them in the form of a letter to Bodrero.
constitutes adequate pre-termination due process•

Such

See, e.g. .

West v. Grand County, 967 F.2d 362, 367 (10th Cir, 1992) (pretermination hearing need not be elaborate, employee must only be
14
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afforded notice and opportunity to be heard).

Horn eschewed the

other pre-termination procedures as well as the post-termination
procedures.

He cannot claim that because he failed to take

advantage of these opportunities he was not afforded due process.
Had he taken advantage of these procedures he would have been
afforded ample opportunity to disprove the allegations alleged as
the basis for his termination and ample opportunity to clear any
stigma attached to his name by the defendants' alleged actions.
Horn's claim that he was deprived of a liberty interest without
due process thus must fail.

Therefore, defendants' motion for

summary judgment on this issue is granted.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, and good cause
appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted.

Dated this

\}9^

day of December, 1994.

BY THE COURT:

David K. Winder
Chief Judge
15
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Copies of the foregoing Order were mailed, postage
prepaid, this

/^»

day of December, 1994, addressed as

follows:
J. Mark Ward, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
L. Zane Gill, Esq.
215 South State St., Suite 545
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

7/fab <**?>&[** IK *t. A)
Secretary
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
Michael Horn,
Plaintiff,

:

JUDGMENT

i

-VS-

A. Roland Squire, Arthur J.
Hudachko, Douglas Bodrero, and
John Does 1-10.
j
Defendants.

Case No. 91-C-1016W

:

In accordance with the Memorandum Decision and Order
entered this date which grants summary judgment to the defendants
and against the plaintiffs, and pursuant to Rule 58 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

Judgment is entered in favor of the defendants and

against the plaintiff of dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's
Amended Verified Complaint.

1
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2.

All of the parties are to bear their own attorney

fees and costs.

Dated this

isk

day of December, 1994

BY THE COURT:

David K. Winder
Chief Judge
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Copies of the foregoing Judgment were mailed, postage
prepaid, this

/4£

day of December, 1994, addressed as

follows:
J. Mark Ward, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
L. Zane Gill, Esq.
215 South State St., Suite 545
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

7/Mh«^

f
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ADDENDUM C

&

&

n
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
CENTRAL DltfiaON

MICHAEL HOM,
Plaintiff(s),

Case No. 91-C-1016 W

v.
A. ROLAND SQUIRE, et al.,

ORDER

Defendant(s).

Plaintiff's October 1 1 , 1994 motion to amend complaint was briefed by the
parties and argued at a hearing held October 3 1 , 1994, at-which the Honorable
Judge Ronald N. Boyce presided. Plaintiff was represented at the October 31st
hearing by his attorney of record L. Zane Gi'!, and defendants were represented by
their attorney of record, Assistant Attorney General J. Mark Ward.
At the October 3 1 , 1994 hearing, the magistrate judge requested
supplemental briefing by the parties, and the magistrate judge took the motion to
amend under advisement pending submission and review of those supplemental
briefs. The parties did submit supplemental briefs subsequent to the October 31st
hearing, as requested.

000 4 1 ^ 7

On Friday November 18, 1994, at the end of the hearing in this case but on
another issue, the magistrate judge announced to the parties9 counsel a decision
to deny the motion to amend. The basis of the ruling is as follows:
1 • Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend and bring a cause of action for
handicap discrimination under Sectton 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794, and/or 42 U.S.C. S 1983, is denied for two reasons:
A. In the interest of just and orderly judicial administration, and under
Rule 15(b) Fed. R. of Civ. P., such an amendment is untimely in that
it would unduly prejudice defendants in maintaining their defense of
the present action upon the merits.
B. Utah's 4-year personal injury statute of limitations (Utah Code §
78-12-25 (1994)) governs plaintiff's proposed Section 504 claim.
The original complaint herein was filed within four years after
plaintiff's employment was terminated, but the present motion to
amend was not filed within four years of that emplcpyment
termination. Plaintiff's proposed amended claim under Section 504
does not properly relate back to the date of the original pleading
herein, for purposes of Rule 15(c)(2) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

2
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Therefore, there is a significant issue of the application of the statute
of limitations.
2. The court expressly declines to rule in the present context on the law
concerning accrual and tolling of causes of action and how the law may or may
not affect tne validity of a handicap discrimination claim under the controlling
statute of limitations. The present posture of the case does not present facts
upon which to make such a ruling.
3. The court also denies plaintiff's motion to amend to further state a cause
of action for liberty interest violations without due process under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (hereinafter "liberty interest claim"). This amendment is unnecessary,
because the liberty interest claim was already effectively plead and preserved and
is being litigated before the court in the present action.
DATED this

Q

day of December 1994.
BY THE COURT:

^

^

^

^

Ronald N. Boyce
United States Magistrate Judge
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United States District Court
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